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IN THE SUPRE.ME~ COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VADA J. TOMLINSON .&COTT, REBA 
TOMLINSON FULLER, RUBY TOl\;f-
LINSON BEEBE, NORA E. TOMLIN-
SON SCHOCKLEY, MARGUERITE 
TOMLINSON CISNEY, and ALTON E. 
TOMLINSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
LESLIE A. TOMLINSON, Individually 
and as Administrator of the Estate of A. 
L. Tomlinson, Deceased, 
· Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8879 
BRIEF OF DEFENDAN'T AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action to impose a trust on certain mining 
claims and for an accounting of the proceeds. The trial 
court held in favor of the plaintiffs and respondents, 
and this appeal is taken from the judgment. The par-
ties hereto are the heirs at law of one A. L. Tomlinson, 
· deceased. The plaintiffs and respondents, who will here-
after be referred to as plaintiffs, are the brother and 
sisters of the defendant and appellant, who was the ad-
ministrator of the estate of A. L. Tomlinson, deceased, 
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and will hereafter be referred to as defendant. The 
n1ining claims involved herein were known as the Camp 
Bird Nos. 1-14, and will be referred to herein as the 
Camp Bird claims. The question of the trust was tried 
before the court September 13, 14 and 15, 1954, and it is 
but a small part of the transcript. The matter of the 
accounting was tried in January and February of 1958, 
and accounts for the major part of the record. This 
appeal mainly concerns the issues relating to the trust. 
The transcript of the testimony is in two volumes. The 
volume relating to the testimony September 13, 14, and 
15, 1954 will be referred to as Volume One and designated 
as, "(T1)". The volume relating to the testimony Janu-
ary and February, 1958, will be referred to as Volume 
Two and designated as, "(T2) ". 
The Camp Bird claims were originally located by 
the defendant, his father A.L. Tomlinson and the hus-
bands of two of the plaintiffs, (Tl. 43, 94, 2-!8). At the 
time of his death, A. L. Tomlinson was the sole owner of 
the claims, the other locators having conveyed to him by 
quit claim deed. The petition for probate was filed in the 
Seventh Judicial Court, Emery Count~~, Utah, in June of 
1942, Probate No. 57±, (Exh. 18) (Tl. 150). One Alvin 
Wallace was appointed and qualified as adininistrator 
of the estate. The 1nining claims were subject to con-
flicting claims of other locators, and in 1942, the Tom-
linson interest in the Camp Bird clailns was reduced to 
7.5 percent interest. The stipulation setting forth the 
interest is a part of Probate file No. 57 4, Exhibit 18. 
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Thereafter, the Tomlinson interest was reduced to 5 
percent, ( Tl. 125). The 2.5 percent being conveyed to 
F. B. Hammond, attorney for the estate, in settlement 
of his claims, (Exh. 18) (T1125). In February of 1949, 
the heirs compelled the removal of the administrator 
and the defendant, Leslie A. Tomlinson, was appointed. 
The inventory and appraisal filed in said probate pro-
ceeding listed the Camp Bird claims as the only asset of 
the estate, and the claims were appraised at a total value 
of $2800.00. Prior to his appointment as administrator, 
the defendant had relocated the Camp Bird claims be-
cause there was doubt as to their validity, (Tl. 250). Fol-
lowing his appointment, the defendant, as administrator, 
entered into several lease agreements for the purpose of 
mining the ore from the claims. These leases purported 
to lease the entire interest in the Camp Bird claims, ( Tl. 
250), the administrator not being aware of the stipulation 
giving other parties 95 percent of the Camp Bird claims. 
These leases provided for the usual15 percent royalty to 
be paid to the Tomlinson estate, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the only purchaser, was advised of the lease 
agreements, and all the royalty checks were paid to the 
estate bank account at Grand Junction, Colorado, (Exh. 
F) (Tl. 251; T2. 114). As a result of these operations, 
$7,329.80 in royalty monies had been paid into the estate 
account by April of 1950, (Tl. 251-253). 
In January of 1950, the defendant entered into a 
lease arrangement with E. G. Frawley, who assigned the 
lease to a corporation he organized under the nmne of 
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Continental Mining & Milling Company, hereafter re-
ferred to as Continental. The lease agreement (Exh. 
0) (Tl. 251-258) recited matters relating to conflicting 
claims and the stipulation reducing the Tomlinson inter-
est to 5 percent. This was the first the defendant knew 
of the stipulation, (Tl. 257). The agreement contained 
the recital that the conflicts were without merit and that 
it was the intention to lease the entire interest in the 
Camp Bird claims. Upon these representations, the 
corporation agreed to clear the title. To facilitate the 
lease arrangement, the administrator obtained quit claim 
deeds from each of the heirs of the estate. These deeds 
are referred to as the 1950 deeds. The administrator 
wrote to the heirs advising them of the contemplated 
lease and requested the quit claim deeds. The defend-
ant advised them that the claims would be held for their 
benefit as their interest might appear, (Exh. C). Shortly 
after the execution of the lease, the lessee, Continental, 
filed an action against the estate on the grounds that the 
title to the ·Can1p Bird claims had been 1nisrepresented. 
This action was never tried, ( Tl. 288). During the spring 
of 1950, a substantial part of the owners of other claims 
on Temple l\Iountain entered into a lease with Consoli-
dated Uranium l\iines, Inc., hereafter referred to as Con-
solidated, (T2. 122). These parties included smne of the 
persons ·who had an interest in the Crunp Bird claims 
under the stipulation of 1942 and others who claimed 
ownership of the ground by reason of conflicting clailns, 
(T2. 122). In January of 1951, the defendant individually 
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and as administrator of the estate, signed a document pur-
porting to be a joinder to the lease upon certain specific 
conditions, (Exh. R) (T2. 34). The conditions were that 
the corporation, subject to an action filed in the District 
Court of Emery County, Utah, Civil No. 1713, obtain 
from all the parties to the lease an acknowledgment of 
the Tomlinson 5 percent interest, and an agreement to 
pay all accrued royalties according to that interest. In 
December, 1951, the defendant individually and as ad-
ministrator of the estate entered into a further stipu-
lation with Therald Jensen and Frank Hanson, attorneys 
of Price, Utah, who represented the owners of 95 percent 
of the Temple Mountain property, (T2. 122-125). This 
stipulation reduced the interest of the Tomlinson estate 
to a 3.53 percent interest, and committed the Tomlinson 
interest to the 1\tfay, 1950 lease with Consolidated, not-
withstanding the joinder of January, 1951, (Exh. R). The 
stipulation and agreement also provided that because 
of litigation the funds were to be held in a trust account. 
In the early part of 1951, the plaintiffs were dis-
satisfied with the estate, no distribution having been 
made, and they made repeated requests of the defendant 
to distribute the monies in the estate, ( Tl. 39). The de-
fendant informed the plaintiffs that he could not distri-
bute the estate until the conflicts were resolved and dis-
tribution was ordered by the court. This matter finally 
came to a head in June of 1952. Under date of June 2, 
1952, the plaintiffs and their mother, Lilie M. Tomlinson, 
who was not a party to the action, executed quit claim 
deeds in favor of the defendant, (Exh. A-1 to A-7). 
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These deeds are referred to as the 1952 deeds. In Febru-
ary of 1953, upon due notice to the plaintiffs, the quit 
claim deeds were confirmed by the court and the prop-
erty distributed to the defendant, (Exh. 18). 
The plaintiffs had been dissatisfied with the estate 
matters since the commencement of the probate proceed-
ings in June of 1942. This was the reason for the change 
of administrators in January of 1949. This dissatisfac-
tion became acute in 1951, the plaintiffs demanding that 
the administrator distribute the estate property, (Tl. 268, 
269). To clarify the situation, C. Allen Elggren, the at-
torney for the estate, addressed a letter to the defendant 
explaining the controversies and possible liabilities of 
the estate by reason of the mining operations conducted 
by the defendant, (Exh. E). The letter was sent by the 
defendant to his mother in Fruita, Colorado, who in turn 
showed it to the plaintiffs, (Tl. 183). ~Irs. Cisney lived 
next door to ~Irs. Tomlinson, and the other plaintiffs 
lived near by or frequently visiting their 1nother. This 
situation continued through 1951, and until the late spring 
of 1952 when the heirs beca1ne insistent that the estate 
be distributed, (Tl. 268). The stipulation of Dece1nber, 
1951, had resolved certain of the conflicts, but the Hunt 
v. Bi.tterbaum, rase, Civil No. 1713, was still undecided 
and other conflicts ·were undetennined. The defendant 
and his 1nother, Lilie ~L T01nlinson, testified that the 
heirs ·were told that the defendant could not distribute 
the estate and that the conflicts still hadn't been settled. 
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The defendant testified that none of the adverse claim-
ants, including the parties to the stipulation and agree-
ment of 1951, were aware of the amount of ore removed 
from the Ca1np Bird claims by the defendant in 1949 and 
1950. The mother, Lilie M. Tomlinson, testified that the 
plaintiffs insisted that they take their share of the estate 
and convey the mining claims to the defendant upon the 
condition that if any monies were required to be repaid 
as a result of the conflicting claims, the defendant would 
assume that liability, (Tl. 192). It was also agreed that 
the defendant assume all expense relating to the mining 
claims, and would make no claim against the plaintiffs, 
(Tl. 269). As a result of these conversations, the attor-
ney for the estate drafted the deeds and they were sent 
to ~Irs. Tomlinson at Fruita. The defendant was not 
present when the plaintiffs executed the deeds except 
the plaintiff Alton Tomlinson, who testified that he signed 
the deed at his mother's home and that the defendant 
was asleep on the couch, ( Tl. 108). All of the deeds were 
returned to C. Allen Elggren except one, and he sent them 
for recording. The one not returned to Mr. Elggren was 
the deed signed by Mrs. Cisney, which was recorded at 
her request, (Exh. A-2). At the time the petition for 
distribution was heard, Mrs. Lilie l\1. Tomlinson was 
present in court as well as the plaintiff Schockley and 
1\fr. Lawrence Fuller, husband of the plaintiff Fuller. 
Mrs. Fuller and Mrs. Cisney both live in Fruita, Colo-
rado, and testified that they had frequent conversations 
about the estate. All of the plaintiffs testified that after 
June of 1952, they did not evidence any further interest 
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until April, 1954, (Tl. 180). At this time, they received 
a letter from John Lowe, one of the attorneys for plain-
tiffs, advising them that they had an interest in the 
Temple Mountain properties and that he could recover 
it for them, (Tl. 64). This inquiry to the plaintiffs was 
rnade at the suggestion of Mr. Lawrence ~Iigliaccio, 
(T2. 46). Mr. Migliaccio had been responsible for the 
reduction of the Tomlinson interest and was a constant 
antagonist of Mr. Frawley and Consolidated and other 
persons connected with that company, (T2. 45). The 
circumstances surrounding the contact with the plain-
tiffs is not entirely unlike the situation presented to this 
court in Nokes v. Conttnental1llining and Milling Com-
pany, 6 Utah 2d 177,308 P. 2d 954. 
Early in 1950, the defendant assisted :Jir. E. G. 
Frawley, president of Consolidated, in an attempt to 
commit the various owners of the Ternple ~fountain prop-
erties to a lease with Consolidated, (T2. 125, 206-209). 
During this time, he assisted in loc.ating other claims and 
relocating existing claims on Te1nple l\Iountain. He also 
worked as a foreman for Consolidated on Temple )foun-
tain claims owned and located by that company and 
Continental. The defendants association '"ith l\fr. Fraw-
ley continued until1953. In the fall of 1952, ~Ir. Frawley 
gave the defendant 32,000 shares of the cmnnron stock 
of Consolidated, (Tl. 306). This stock was given by 
reason of the work he had done for Consolidated over 
the past two years. In 1953 and 1954, the defendant sold 
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the stock. The plaintiffs in their complaint asked that 
a trust be imposed on the proceeds of the sale of the 
stock. 
The testimony of the plaintiffs relating to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of the 1952 deeds 
adds up to one fact; they were completely ignorant of all 
matters relating to the estate and the properties of the 
estate. On direct examination, each testified that they 
did not know the condition of the estate, when it might 
be closed, their interest in the estate as an heir, the status 
of the titles of the mining claims, what claims were in the 
estate, the litigation with relation to the claims, the value 
of the mining claims, the extent that mining had been 
conducted on the claims, the amount of royalty paid into 
the estate nor the matters relating to the ~tock of Con-
solidated. This testimony is summarized on pages 26 to 
30 of the transcript, Volume One. On cross examination, 
the plaintiffs testified that at the time they signed the 
1952 deeds they had in mind that they had previously 
executed deeds, and the circumstances relating thereto, 
(Tl. 47, 108). The plaintiff Cisney testified that she 
signed the deed believing it was required to enable the 
defendant to enter into a lease and that the defendant 
agreed to divide the claims equally, ( Tl. 43, 85). All of 
the other plaintiffs stated that they relied on what Mrs. 
Cisney had told them in executing the deeds, and speci-
fically stated they did not rely on the defendant, (Tl. 
65, 77, 96,132, 135). Each of them stated in identical 
words that the defendant had agreed to divide the claims 
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equally. On cross examination, the plaintiffs also admit-
ted they were told the estate could not be distributed 
until the title and conflicting claims were settled, 
(Tl. 96, 256, 265, 266). They also adn1itted that they 
knew there was $5,000.00 or $6,000.00 in the estate bank 
account, (Tl. 73, 100), and they were entitled to an equal 
share in the claims as an heir, (Tl. 44, 77). In executing 
the 1952 deeds, they stated that they did not read them 
except to note that the Camp Bird claims were listed, 
(Tl. 52). During the trial in September, 1954, these 
plaintiffs claimed a privilege when asked if they. had 
discussed the matters relating to the estate with their 
husbands. In subsequent hearings in January and Febru-
ary of 1958, Lawrence Cisney, the husband of nfarguer-
ite Cisney, took the stand as a witness on behalf of the 
plaintiffs. On cross examination, he admitted that he and 
his wife and the plaintiff Fuller were on the claims in 
1950 and had talked to ~fr. Frawley, (Tl. 82) ; that ~fr. 
Frawley told them they would soon begin to get some-
thing from the mining claims, (T2. 53). He also testified 
that they knew the claims had been leased to Consolidated 
and that the defendant had been prmnised son1e of Con-
solidated's stock by ~Ir. Frawley. ( T2. 53). Of the 
1natters whieh plaintiffs clain1ed they had no knowledge, 
only two are not ad1nitted. These h\'O 1natters are the 
status of the titles of the mining clailns and the Yalue of 
the 1nining elaims. The defendant called as a ·witness 
Therald Jensen, an attorney of Price, Utah. He testified 
that the title of the Can1p Bird rlai1ns was Yer~- question-
able and he regarded then1 as having only a nuisance 
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value, ( T2. 122). The only testimony in the record as to 
the value of the claims in 1952 is the amount of royalty 
that the mining operations had produced, a fact lrnown 
to the plaintiffs. The defendant was asked if he knew 
the status of the titles of the mining cla.ims and the value 
of the mining claims, over the objection of the defendant 
that this called for a conclusion, the defendant testified 
that he was advised that the validity of the Camp Bird 
claims was questionable, (Tl. 275). He further stated that 
he did not have any idea as to the value of the mining 
cla.ims, (Tl. 275). As to all matters the plaintiffs ad-
mitted or it was shown by evidence that they had equal 
knowledge with the defendant. While five of the six 
plaintiffs were women, three of them, Beebe, Cisney and 
Fuller, were married to men who had an acquaintance 
with mining activities, two of whom had been locators 
of the Camp Bird cla.ims. One of the plaintiffs was in 
business for herself, ( Tl. 133), and all the others had an 
education superior to that of the defendant, ( Tl. 248). 
The plaintiff Alton Tomlinson was a rancher and admit-
ted familiarity with business dealings and the manner 
in which real estate is transferred and the effect of a 
quit claim deed, (Tl. 107-110). The defendant was a car-
penter by trade, having little or no formal education. 
His first contact with mining was after the death of his 
father when he attempted to relocate the claims. He had 
no experience which qualified him as a business man, 
earning his livelihood as a manual laborer, ('Tl. 247, 248). 
The plaintiffs referred to him as, "Tight old Les." In 
contrast to the testimony of the plaintiffs, their mother, 
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Lilie M. Tomlinson, related the conversations she had 
with Cisney and the other plaintiffs. She testified that 
it was the understanding of everyone that they were 
conveying the claims to Les for whatever he might gain 
or lose, and they were not to be responsible in any way, 
(Tl. 190). In their complaint, the plaintiffs did not join 
Mrs. Tomlinson as a party plaintiff, but in the prayer of 
the complaint asked that the trust be imposed upon the 
Inining claims for her benefit. Mrs. Tomlinson refused to 
be a party, and the complaint was amended eliminating 
her from the prayer for relief, (R. 9). The evidence in 
the accounting introduced by the plaintiffs disclosed the 
liability which the estate was subject to on June 2, 1952. 
The plaintiffs own accounting claimed $16,000.00 should 
have been paid to the estate as royalties to May, 1950, 
(Exh. N). At that time, it was undisputed and admitted 
by all of the plaintiffs that they knew that the Tomlinson 
interest had been reduced to 5 percent. Of the amount 
of royalty claimed according to plaintiffs evidence, they 
are only entitled to $800.00, the re1naining belonging to 
the parties to the 1942 and 1951 stipulations. The $16,-
000.00 royalty was based on contracts providing for a 
payment of 15 percent of the 1nill returns. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs evidence show that the estate was liable for 
over $100,000.00 by reason of the trespass if the title to 
the Cmnp Bird claims was upset. The plaintiffs never 
stated that the disclosure of any of the facts claiined to 
have been withheld would have cmupelled them to act 
differently. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT A TRUST WAS CREATED MUST BE RE-
VERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
A TRUST CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON PROPERTY 
WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE ESTATE AND WAS NOT IN 
EXISTENCE AT THE TIME THE TRUST WAS CREATED. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES AND ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
POINT IV. 
THE PROBATE DECREE IS RES JUDICATA AND IS 
NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTA·CK. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT A TRUST WAS ·CREATED MUST BE RE-
VERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The consideration of the correctness of the trial 
court's conclusion with respect to the trust has several 
facets. First, the nature of the trust, secondly, the fidu-
ciary relationship of the parties, and thirdly, the char-
acter of the evidence required to sustain the conclusion 
of the trial court. 
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The nature of the trust imposed in the instant case, 
is found in conclusions 1, 2, and 3 of the Conclusions of 
Law, (R. 91, 92). In conclusions 1 and 2, the court con-
cluded that the defendant held the property upon an ex-
press trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs. In conclusion 
3, the court concluded that the defendant held the prop-
erty upon a constructive trust for the benefit of the 
plaintiffs. It is difficult to understand how an express 
and constructive trust can exist at the same time, as to 
the same property and for the benefit of the same per-
sons. The distinctions between the trusts are clear and 
the creation of one must necessarily negative the creation 
of the other. The distinctions are spelled out in IV Scott 
on Trusts, sec. 462.1, pp. 3104, 3105 : 
"Sec. 462.1. Constructive trusts distinguish-
ed from express and resulting trusts. An express 
trust is a fiduciary relationship "ith respect to 
property, arising as a result of a manifestation 
of an intention to create it and subjecting the per-
son in whmn the title is vested to equitable duties 
to deal with it for the benefit of others. On the 
other hand, a constructive trust arises ·where a 
person holding title to property is subject to an 
equitable duty to eonve~- it to another on the 
ground that he ·would be unjustly enriched if he 
were permitted to retain it. In both cases the 
person who has the title to the property is under 
an eqilltable dut~T to deal ·with it for the benefit 
of another person. To this extent the two types 
of trust are siinilar. In other respects, however, 
they differ. An express trust arises because the 
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parties intended to create it. A constructive 
trust is not based upon the intention of the par-
ties but is imposed in order to prevent one of them 
from being unjustly enriched at the expense of the 
other. In the case of an express trust the trustee 
ordinarily has active duties of management. In 
the case of a constructive trust, the duty is merely 
to surrender the property. A constructive trust, 
unlike an express trust, is not a fiduciary relation. 
The circumstances which give rise to a construc-
tive trust may, but do not necessarily, involve a 
fiduciary relation. 
* * * 
"From what has been said it will be seen that 
it is useless if not mischievious to attempt to 
phrase a definition of a trust so as to include both 
express trusts and constructive trusts. They are 
distinct concepts. They are not two species of a 
single genus." 
From the foregoing statement, it would appear that 
one might plead an express trust and as an alternative 
a constructive trust, but to say that both coexist as a 
conclusion of law upon which a judgment is based would 
appear to be such a contradiction that as a matter of 
law the judgment must be reversed. The importance of 
this objection to the determination of the trial court is 
more serious than a claim of error upon technical dis-
tinctions, but is an integral part of the other facets above 
specified. The trusts imposed herein are based upon 
a fiduciary relationship. The nature of the relationship 
is important because it influenced the conclusion that an 
express and constructive trust were created. And more 
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important the decision of the trial court was based en-
tirely on the single fact of a fiduciary relationship. No 
express trust was proven and the conduct of the defend-
ant was not sufficient to raise a constructive trust even 
in the presence of a fiduciary relationship. The defend-
ant does not believe that a fiduciary is a highway that 
persons blind and ignorant to their rights, negligent in 
protecting them, tardy in objecting to them, can travel 
to recover what they have neglected and cast away. The 
fiduciary relationship is of obvious importance because 
in the words of Professor Scott, the truth of the matter 
is that whenever a court wishes to compel a transferee 
to reconvey the property, it can do so by laying stress 
ori the confidential relation, and it is as much a matter 
of truth that if the court desires to deny relief it can 
lay stress upon the policy of the Statute of Frauds and 
emphasize the possibilities of fraudulent claims which 
might be made if relief was given. I Scott on Trusts, sec. 
-±4.2, p. 322. In substance, the fiduciary relationship is a 
two-way street, and not restricted to travel by only the 
plaintiffs. The fiduciary relationship might be said to be 
twofold. First, the duty by reason of being administrator 
of the estate, and secondly, by reason of the family rela-
tionship between the parties. That duty as it relates to 
the office of administrator is defined as follows: 
2 Bancroft Probate Practice, sec. 332, p. 277: 
.. An adn1inistrator is said to be 1nore the 
representative of the creditors than of the heirs. 
He holds the estate as a trust fund for the pay-
Inent of debts. He does, however. to a large extent 
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also represent the heirs or devisees, as is indi-
cated by the fact that they are often dependent 
upon his diligence for the maintenance of their 
rights." 
Sec. 334, p. 279 : 
"In general, his duties are to preserve the 
estate until distribution, to collect and safely keep 
the property, to pay the indebtedness of the de-
ceased and the charges of administration and to 
put the estate in such condition that distribution 
may be had, and, when claims are satisfied, to 
pass the estate pursuant to order of court on to 
those entitled." 
I I S coU on Trusts, sec. 173, p. 1293 : 
"Sec. 173. Duty to furnish information. The 
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to 
give them upon their request at reasonable times 
complete and accurate information as to the ad-
ministration of the trust. The beneficiaries are 
entitled to know what the trust property is and 
how the trustee has dealt with it. They are en-
titled to examine the trust property and the ac-
counts and vouchers and other documents relating 
to the trust and its administration. Where a trust 
is created for several beneficiaries, each of them 
is entitled to information as to the trust." 
The duty of brother to sister has always been regard-
ed as requiring fair dealing, however, not to the extent 
of giving advise and counsel. This may or may not be 
the situation as a practical matter. It must be accepted 
as a common occurrence that the relationship is at times 
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characterized by suspicion and distrust, by an attitude 
of wariness and more frequently of envy and jealousy. 
Where these occur, the fiduciary relationship is insecure 
and the words, "We trust him," are most abused. 
The plaintiffs in this action are adults, none of whom 
are under a physical or mental disability, and who had 
education and experience superior or equal to the defend-
ant. Their attitude towards the defendant bordered on 
contempt referring to him as, "Tight old Les," because 
of his ability to accumulate a little money and property 
from the wages of an ordinary laborer. In addition to 
this, the appointment of the defendant as administrator 
was not indicative of any trust. The defendant was the 
only heir living in the State of Utah and had a statutory 
preference. In the final analysis, the plaintiffs demon-
strated the nature of their trust by accepting the solicita-
tion in 1954, brought about by Lawrence Migliaccio, who, 
with his attorneys John W. Lowe and Thomas C. Cuth-
bert, were primarily responsible for the reduction of the 
Tomlinson interest to a 3.53 percent. (Hunt v. Bitter-
baum, Civil No. 1713 in the District Court of En1ery 
County, State of Utah.) The trust they claim to have had 
in the defendant did not extend to the courtesy of a 
personal inquiry before accepting the assistance offered 
by the attorneys. If this fiduciary relationship is to be 
emphasized to the extrmne necessary to sustain tlris judg-
Inent, the truth is 1nore callus than Professor Scott 
in1plied. 
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By reason of the fortuitous or unfortuitous event of 
being an heir, a person is not relieved of the necessity 
of 1naking decisions with respect to the rights that event 
ereated. This court has announced this principle. 
In re Blodgett's Estate, 70 P. 2d 742, 93 Utah 1: 
"His duty as administrator went to the obli-
gation to take into possession and disclose all es-
tate property and all information to those inter-
ested in the estate as to estate matters, thus put-
ting them on the same plane as he was as to such 
information regarding all the assets and transac-
tions, but, when that is done, he has performed his 
duty to a party in regard to whom he is in contro-
versy as to their respective interests. In that re-
lationship, after they are on an even plane as to 
all estate matters, she must exercise the decisions 
as to whether she will stand firm or recede in the 
controversy between them as to differenees of 
opinion regarding their rights." 
The plaintiffs rely on a total absence of knowledge 
of the facts. They testified that they never took any 
interest in the estate. In executing the deeds, they did not 
rely on representation of the defendant, but did rely on 
the statement of one of the plaintiffs who, inspite of the 
elaim of total ignorance, advised the other heirs to exe-
cute the deeds. Taking into consideration the fact that 
their entire testimony was negative except a single state-
ment deemed necessary to create an allusion of express 
trust, i.e., the defendant had agreed to divide the claims 
equally; that the only testimony offered in support of 
their cause was their own testimony necessarily colored 
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because of their direct pecuniary interest. It must be 
concluded that as a matter of law, no trust was proven. 
This court has considered the proposition as follows: 
Coray v. Holbrook, et al., 121 P. 572, 575, 40 Utah 
325: 
"* * * One seeking to have rights declared awl 
enforced, founded upon a verbal or written agree-
ment, and involving or growing out of an alleged 
trust or confidential relation, is required, among 
other things, to show, with at least reasonable 
certainty, the terms of the agreement and the 
character and extent of the trust or confidential 
relation. These things cannot be left to loose or 
flexible language, or to vague or indefinite terms. 
The court, from the language used, from the acts 
and conduct of the parties, and from all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the alleged agree-
ment, and under which it was made, must be able 
to ascertain, with at least reasonable certainty, 
the essential terms of the agreement and the char-
acter and extent of the alleged trust or confiden-
tial relation." 
The character of the plaintiffs evidence requires con-
sideration of the proof necessary to establish a trust. 
The accepted rule as to the burden or proof in fraud cases 
is that the person seeking to ilnpose a constructive or an 
express trust has the burden of establishing the facts that 
giv<> ri~(' to such a trust. He n1ust establish such facts 
hy clear and convincing evidence, it is not enough to es-
tablish theu1 h~· a 1nere preponderance of the eYidence. 
Flemin.f! v. F!CJwiug-F('lt ComJJall,lJ~ 7 lTtah :?d 293 323 P. 
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2d 712. r:rhe court in its oral decision at the beginning of 
the January hearings, states, "but the proof in the other 
case satisfied me, or by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence," (T2.6). The case should be reversed upon this 
alone, but defendant's case is based on a more funda-
mental principle than what might be characterized as an 
academic distinction between a mere preponderance and 
clear and convincing evidence. The defendant contends 
that in absence of any affirmative proof whatsoever, 
as a matter of law a constructive trust cannot be created 
or in1posed and an express trust is not established, IV 
Scott on Trusts, sec. 462.6, p. 3112. 
Not every transaction between administrator and an 
heir can be made the subject matter of a constructive 
trust. And where the transaction is entirely between 
heirs, none of whom are acting under an incapacity, the 
circumstances of the fraud should be clear and convinc-
ing. Beginning with line 26, page 139 to line 16 on page 
141 of Volume One of the transcript, counsel for the plain-
tiffs summarized the entire testimony of all of the plain-
tiffs. This summary was the direct examination of V ada 
J. Tomlinson Acott, and in the direct examination of 
every other plaintiff, including Mrs. Cisney, the same 
answers are found. In the testimony on the pages indi-
cated, the plaintiffs simply answer, "No" to matters 
which would be common knowledge to a person claiming 
an interest in property. Each of the plaintiffs testified 
that they relied entirely on the plaintiff Cisney when 
they signed the deeds in 1952. It is difficult to under-
stand why a person knowing absolutely nothing would 
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advise her brother and sisters, who also knew absolutely 
nothing, to sign quit claim deeds. Of the questions asked 
on the pages above referred to, the record disclosed that 
they were advised of all but two matters in June of 1952; 
the value of the interest and the title situation. These 
two matters were also beyond the knowledge of the de-
fendant. The title being still in litigation and the only 
gauge of value being the royalty. Thus, as a matter of 
fact, the plaintiffs knew all there was to know about the 
estate. Under such circumstances a constructive trust 
cannot arise. 
IV Scott on Trusts, sec. 496, p. 3217: 
"Sec. 496. Effect of consent of beneficiarY. 
As has been stated, ·where a trustee purchas~s 
trust property for himself individually ''ith the 
consent of the beneficiary, or purchases for him-
self the interest of the beneficiary. the transaction 
cannot be set aside bY the beneficiarY if he was 
not under an incapacity, and the tru~tee made a 
full disclosure to hiln, and did not induce the sale 
by taking advantage of his position or b3- other 
ilnproper conduct, and if the transaction was in 
all respect fair and reasonable. A silnilar princi-
ple is applicable where other kinds of fiduciaries 
deal with their beneficiaries. It is probably true 
that in som(' fiduciary relations the consent of the 
benefician· will prevent his setting aside the 
trammetion, although under the sa1ne circum-
shmees the heneficiar~- of an express trust would 
not be precluded frmn setting aside the transac-
tion." 
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The nature of the fiduciary and the character of 
evidence is important in considering the plaintiffs claim 
that there was no consideration. This is believed im-
material because a gratuitous conveyance may be proper, 
but the consideration was more than adequate. The plain-
tiffs claimed that all proceeds shown by Exhibit M had 
been received by the defendant. The defendant agreed 
to protect the plaintiffs from any judgment or demand, 
as well as any repayment of funds ordered by the court, 
and to bear all expenses of the estate. 
Considering the three matters above set forth, the 
plaintiffs are faced with a dilemma. It is impossible 
to see how the transaction can be both an express and 
constructive trust. They rely on the deeds of 1952 as an 
express trust and it must fail because the trust is not 
evidenced by an agreement or a memorandum of an oral 
agreement as required by the Statute of Frauds, I Scott 
on Trusts, sec. 40.1. (Conclusions of Law, paragraph 2, 
R. 91). They rely on the deeds of 1950 as the creation of 
a constructive trust, (Conclusions of Law, paragraph 3, 
R. 91), which fails because the only purpose or effect 
that could be given the 1952 deeds is that they extinguish 
the 1950 trust whether constructive or express. IV Scott 
on Trusts, sec. 481.3, p. 3153. 
POINT II. 
A TRUST CANNOT BE IMPOSED ON PROPERTY 
WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE ESTATE AND WAS NOT IN 
EXISTENCE AT THE TIME THE TRUST WAS CREATED. 
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In September of 1952, the defendant was given stock 
of Con!iolidated by Mr. Fra\vley. The court imposed a 
trust on the proceeds of the sale of the stock as an asset 
of the estate. The stock was sold in July of 1953, April, 
1954 and July, 1954. There is no evidence in the record 
tracing any property or assets of the estate into the 
stock, (Exh. U). It is difficult to understand on what 
theory the plaintiffs claim this an asset of the estate. 
There was never any contention that this stock was part 
of the original estate of A. L. Tomlinson, deceased. The 
inventory and appraisement in the probate proceedings 
listed only the Can1p Bird claims. The only document 
relating to any stock is the lease with Continental in 1950, 
which that company as lessee repudiated. The only prop-
erty right the Tomlinsons ever had by reason of the estate 
was committed to the lease with Consolidated in 1950 by 
the agreement, Exhibit F. No part of the estate is mis-
sing, no part of the estate was sold by the defendant and 
it has never been claimed that the defendant purchased 
the stock ·with assets of the estate. 
IF Scott on TntSts, sec. 521.-1. p. 3335: 
"Sec. 521.-1. Where no property of the claim-
ant was received by the wrongdoer. By the weight 
of authority the claimant is not entitled to a pre-
ference where, although the wrongdoer received 
property of the clai1nant, he subsequently dissi-
pated it. It would seen1 to be even n1ore clear that 
the elain1ant i~ not entitled to a preference ·where 
no propert~· of the clai1nant was eYer reeeived by 
the wrongdoer. In ~ueh a case, there is no prop-
ert~· of the wrongdoer which i~ in any sense the 
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product of the claimant's property, no property 
upon which the claimant can enforce an equitable 
lien or constructive trust. It has been so held in a 
case decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States." Citing McKee v. Paradise, 299 U.S. 119, 
122, 57 S. Ct. 124, 81 L. ed. 75, 3 U. Chicago L. Rev. 
515. 
If nothing of the estate is missing, and it was committed 
to a lease upon a royalty basis identical to all other min-
ing claimants, which lease the plaintiffs have confirmed, 
it is difficult to see how a trust could be imposed or one 
could trace any assets of the estate into stock. In addition 
to this, all authorities are of the same mind that a trust 
cannot be imposed on nonexisting property. In order to 
create a trust on the stock, it would have had to have 
been received by the estate at the time the trust was cre-
ated. 
I Scott on Trusts, sec. 86, p. 648: 
"Sec. 86. After-acquired property. It is ob-
vious that a person cannot create a trust of prop-
erty in which he has no interest. The mere fact 
that he hopes and. expects to acquire the property 
in the future does not give him any· interest of 
which he can be trustee, or of which he can make 
another trustee, before he acquires it. Where hf~ 
purports to create a present trust of property 
which he does not own but which he expects there-
after to acquire, no trust is presently created. This 
is true whether he purports to make a transfer in 
trust or to declare himself trustee." 
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Sec. 86.4, p. 663 : 
"An interest which has not come into exist-
ence cannot be held in trust. Thus if a person de-
clares himself trustee of shares of stock in a cor-
poration to be formed, no trust is created at the 
time of the declaration, and even if the corporation 
is later formed and he received shares of stock 
in it, he does not automatically become trustee of 
the shares. At most he has made a promise to be-
come trustee in the future, and the promise is not 
enforceable if gratuitous." 
The trust in this case was created in 1950 or 1952, which, 
is uncertain. If an express trust ·was relied on, it was 
created in 1952. If it was a constructive trust, the plain-
tiffs say it was created in 1950. In either event, it was 
long before the receipt of the stock. Ir Scott on Trnsts, 
sec. 462.4 ~ 4 Bancroft Probate Practice, sec. 1176. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES AND ARE 
NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
The plaintiffs are before the court on one of two 
propositions. Either they tran8ferred their interest in 
1952 with full kno-wledge of all the facts. or they are 
guilty of lache~ such a~ to shock the eonscience of a court 
of equity. 
It is wPll estabished that people who clailn rights 
cannot ad so JwgligPntl~· in relation thereto that it would 
lead the ordinary prrson to believe that they had abandon 
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their right or never clai1ned a right. This is particularly 
so where the defendant substantially changes his position 
because of their conduct. IV Scott on Trusts, sec. 466.1, 
pp. 3121, 3122. In 1949, the plaintiffs participated in the 
re1noval of the administrator originally appointed. This 
action would compel an ordinary person to be more vigi-
lant. In spite of this warning, the plaintiffs again closed 
their eyes to all the matters until1952 when the image of 
dollars captured their entire interest. Having received 
the only thing they were interested in, they again slum-
bered as to matters relating to the estate. They were 
awakened a third time in 1954 when the letter from John 
Lowe again presented the golden image. A court of 
equity might be tolerant and understanding of a person 
once sleeping on his rights, if not for too long, however, 
where a person sleeps on three separate occasions it 
would appear that tolerance and understanding should 
be replaced by critical observation and require convincing 
justification for repeated offenses. It may also be stated 
that a court of equity might be tolerant and under-
standing where a person once conveys his property away 
and attempts to recover it on the state1nent that they did 
so under the belief that it would be held for them in trust. 
If a person conveys away his property, or permits its 
alienation on three occasions, it would appear that toler-
ance and understanding should again be replaced by criti-
cal observation. In 1950, the plaintiffs executed quit 
claim deeds absolute in form upon the understanding that 
the conveyance was in trust. In 1952, the plaintiffs again 
conveyed the same property by deed absolute in form 
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and claimed it was held in trust. In 1953, after having 
notice of the fact that the petition for distribution would 
be heard on a day certain, they permitted a third aliena-
tion of their property and now claim it to be subject to 
a trust. In the 1950 instance, they received an explana-
tion spelling out the trust, (Exh. ·C), and in 1952, they 
testified they were told nothing. The only excuse offered 
was blind trust. In 1953, two of the plaintiffs sat in the 
courtroom and heard the court distribute the claims to 
the defendant as his sole and separate property. They 
were again silent. In 1949 when the first awakening oc-
curred, the potential value of uranium mining claims was 
not realized. In 1950, the plaintiffs Cisney and Fuller 
were physically present on the mining claims and were 
told by Mr. Frawley that they would begin to get some-
thing out of the property, a time at which the potential 
value of uraniu1n 'vas becoming notieeable. In 1952, 
uranium entered upon the most spectacular inflation 
since John Sutter brought to life an en1pire for a small 
sack of eoins, some "·heat, beans and tallow. In February, 
1953, uranium 1nining clalins were being bought and sold 
for 1nillions. Still the plaintiffs slumbered while a de-
eree of distribution was entered. The plaintiffs story of 
their a wakening by the letter frmn John Lowe in 1954 was 
an incident exceeded only by the R\vakening of Sleeping 
Beauty hy the gallant prince. 
The defense of laehes is clearly stated by Seott on 
Trush;: 
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II Scott on Trusts, sec. 219, p. 1609: 
"Sec. 219. Laches of the beneficiary. A bene-
ficiary 1nay be barred by his laches from holding 
the trustee liable for a breach of trust. He is so 
barred if he fails to sue the trustee for the breach 
of trust for so long a time and under such circun1-
stances that it would be inequitable to permit him 
to hold the trustee liable. A1nong the circum-
stances which are of importance are the length 
of time during which the beneficiary has delayed 
in bringing a proceeding against the trustee; the 
reasons for such delay; the character of the breach 
of trust; the change of circumstances, if any, be-
tween the commission of the breach of trust and 
the bringing of the proceeding, such as the death 
of witnesses or parties, or a change of position by 
the trustee. Underlying the notion of the barring 
of suit because of laches is the general idea that 
it is in accordance with public policy that suits 
should be brought with reasonable promptness. 
There is also the idea that after the lapse of a 
long period of tune it is difficult to ascertain the 
truth. There is also the idea of hardship to the 
defendant in pressing stale claims against him, al-
though the hardship to him may be outweighed 
by the hardship to the plaintiff in denying him 
redress.'' 
In imposing the trust the conduct of the plaintiffs 
must be considered. The court should take into considera-
tion that the defendant changed his position. Following 
1952, he justifiably treated the property as his own, which 
1nade identification of funds subsequently received diffi-
cult to trace. His earnings as a laborer were tinged with 
the threat of being construed as trust funds. He justifi-
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ably spent money and every expenditure was questioned. 
Consideration should be given to the fact that the proper-
ties involved sky-rocketed beyond imagination. It should 
be considered that the plaintiffs were so careless and 
negligent that the ordinary person would be led to believe 
that they claimed no interest. It should also be considered, 
that having grossly neglected their rights they now want 
to be forgiven entirely upon negative testimony. These 
circumstances should prevent recovery. 
II Scott on Trusts, sec. 170.2, p. 1200: 
"Defenses of the trustee. The beneficiaries 
may be barred from setting aside a sale by the 
trustee to himself where, with knowledge of the 
facts, they have acquiesced in the sale. On the 
other hand, they are not bound by such acquies-
cence where they had no knowledge of the facts. 
The beneficiaries, having the choice of affirnring 
the sale to the trustee or setting it aside, n1ust act 
with reasonable pr01nptness after they learn of 
the facts. If the~~ delay in 1naking objection to 
the sale for an unreasonably long tiine, they "ill 
be barred by laches. There is no fixed rule as to 
the extent of the delay ·which will preclude the 
beneficiaries frmn setting aside the sale. This de-
pends on1nany circun1stances, such as whether the 
trustee acted in good faith, whether he has 1nade 
expenditures on the property with the knowledge 
of the beneficiaries, whether the property was of 
fluctuating Yalue, or whether there are other cir-
cumstanees 1naking it onl~- fair that the benefici-
aries should act prmnptly .. , 
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POINT IV. 
THE PROBATE DECREE IS RES JUDICATA AND IS 
NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTA.CK. 
The fraud which the plaintiffs allege relates entirely 
to the execution of the quit claim deeds in 1952. There is 
no allegation that a fraud was practiced upon the plain-
tiffs in obtaining the decree of distribution entered in 
1953 in Probate No. 57 4. All of the acts of which the 
plaintiffs complain could have been raised by appropri-
ate objection to the petition for distribution. At that 
time, the slightest objection by one of the plaintiffs would 
have caused the court to withhold its decree until all 
of the plaintiffs had an opportunity to be heard. No 
objection being made and the petition clearly stating that 
the heirs had conveyed their interest to the defendant, 
the court ordered the distribution. This court held in 
Thomas v. Braffet II eirs, decided December 27, 1956, that 
a decree distributing the property of the estate pursuant 
to fmnily settlements and stipulations could not be col-
laterally attacked by the heirs. Thomas v. Braffet Heirs, 
6 Ftah 2d 57, 305 P. 2d 507, In the matter of the Estate 
of James John Latsis (sometimes known as "Latses"), 
deceased, on petition for rehearing, this court reversing 
its decision on appeal and affirming the judgment of the 
trial court stated: 
"There must come an end to probate, and ac-
tion of the court which is intended to close the 
proceedings and settle finally the rights of all 
parties does so, even though some individuals may 
be prejudiced by that action. Since the order here 
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in quest~on fails to put the inquirer upon notice 
that there are conditions precedent to its becoming 
final, it demands the respect to which a final de-
cree is entitled under the statute." In the Matter 
of the Estate of James John Latsis, Deceased, 284 
P. 2d 479,3 Utah 2d 365. 
The nature of the fraudulent acts which this court 
requires to obtain a decree collaterally attacking a 
former judgment has been the subject matter of many 
decisions. In Anderson v. State, et al., 238 P. 557, 65 
Utah 512, this court set forth the nature of the fraud re-
quired in attacking a judgment and added that the par-
ties seeking relief must have been free from negligence 
in the trial of the case in which the judgment was ren-
dered. Weyant v. Utah Savings and Trust Company, 
182 P.189, 54 Utah 181; Wright v. W. E. Callahan Con-
struction Contpany, 156 P. 2d 710, 108 utah 28. In the 
Wright case, it was held as follo1\rs: 
"It is well settled that a court will not grant 
relief and set aside a judgn1ent unless such judg-
ment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; that is 
where the fraud practiced in obtaining the judg-
ment prevented the parties frmn having their day 
in court and the issues involved frmn being tried. 
The failure of a part~- to have used due diligence 
in presenting all the facts in the case to the court 
or in failing to 1neet any perjured testi1nony is 
not such fraud on the court as ''ill be redressed 
in a suit directly attacking the judgn1ent. ""\Yhere 
the issues involved in a case have been fullv tried, 
even though the judg1uent ·was procured by per-
jured evidenc~ and but for such perjury the result 
n1ight have been other\\-ise, the judg1nent will not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
be set aside. To do otherwise would make for 
endless litigation. See Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros. 
Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 P. 986; Mosby v. 
Gisborn, 17 Utah 257, 54 P. 121; Anderson v. 
State, 65 Utah 512, 238 P. 557; Pico v. Cohn, 91 
Cal. 129, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537, 13 L.R.A. 336, 25 
Am. St. Rep. 159; United States v. Throckmorton, 
98 U.S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93; LaSalle v. Peterson et 
al., 220 Cal. 739, 32 P. 2d 612." 
In addition to the cited cases, the Utah stautes are 
clearly in accord. with the principle of the integrity of 
judgment. Section 75-11-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
Section 75-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The defend-
ant did not conceal any facts to obtain the decree. The de-
fendant was and still is of the conviction that the heirs 
conveyed title free and clear of their interest. At the 
tune of the entry of the decree in 1953, he had no notice 
or any suspicions that the plaintiffs would claim that 
the property was subject to a trust. The only persons 
who had any knowledge of this fact and who failed to 
bring it to the attention of the court were the plaintiffs. 
In addition to the failure of the plaintiffs to object 
at the time of the distribution of the estate, they did 
nothing within the time for appeal or the statutory period 
permitting a direct attack upon a decree of a probate 
court. They cannot dispute the fact that in June of 1952, 
they were aware that proceeds were being received from 
the operation of the mining claims. This is for the ob-
vious reason that they received a distribution of these 
accumulated funds. From J lme, 1952, to February, 1953, 
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they made no inquiry or any further demand relating to 
royalties paid to the defendant. After having notice of 
the petition for distribution, and two of the plaintiffs be-
ing present in court at the time the petition was heard, 
they still did not within six months after the entry of the 
decree make inquiry or demand what they now claim. 
Fourteen months later, it still had not occurred 
to the plaintiffs to seek their equal share as a result of 
the express trust they now claim. It was not until Migli-
accio, apparently without their knowledge, procurred an 
attorney for their use that they became aware of what 
they now say they claimed at all times. If there was ever 
a case in which a person was negligent in the assertion 
of his rights in a judicial proceedings, this must be the 
classic example. It is a reasonable conjecture that absent 
the charitable interest of ~1:igliaccio and his attorneys, 
the plaintiffs would now be sleeping on rights they cher-
ished. It is said that a judgment can be attacked collater-
ally if one acts within a reasonable time, meaning that 
equity aids the vigilant. Under the circumstances of 
this case and the increase of property values, the plain-
tiffs should have been aware of their rights by 1952, cer-
tainly by 1953, but to have to be awakened in April of 
195± is a circun1stance suggestive of the Yery reason 
why a court of equity refuses to listen to stale demands. 
If the decree of the probate court in this case can be col-
laterally attacked under such circmnstances. the finalit:T 
of judg1nents considered so important In the lJfa.tter of 
the Estate of James John Latsis, supra, and Thomas v. 
Bra.ffet Heirs, supra, will be a discredited principle. 
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When the plaintiffs executed the 1952 deeds, they 
had only one purpose; to get the available money while 
they had the chance and under circumstances where they 
would not have to repay. They were people of average 
intelligence and understanding of property rights. To 
say that they signed the deeds to obtain the estate money 
or to permit the commitment of the claims to a lease 
which had been entered into two years prior thereto and 
ratified and confirmed on two occasions, is difficult to 
believe. There was no failure to disclose any matter let 
alone one which would have caused them to refuse to sign 
the 1952 deeds. The royalty rate was the same before and 
after, and the properties were no more valuable in 1954 
than they were at any other time. Their value had been 
settled in 1950 when they were committed to the lease. 
\Vhere 1noney is involved, the carefree members of a 
family find it easy when they have neglected their in-
heritance to charge the dilgent member of the family with 
cheating. If a party can claim a trust under the circum-
stances in this case, the purpose of equity and the policy 
of the law is ill served. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED H. EVANS 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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